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Libya and the Post-American World: 
Implications for the EU 
Thomas Renard 
This Security Policy Brief looks at the vote 
on the UNSC resolution on Libya and tries 
to  see  in  it  some  signs  of  the  new 
international order in the making. Why did 
the BRIC countries abstain? Why was the 
US so shy? What does it all mean for the 
EU? 
Libya  has  now  entered  the  “fog  of  war”. 
Gaddafi’s  better-armed  and  better-organised 
forces have so far resisted successive offensives 
from  the  “rebels”,  and  they  have  successfully 
adapted  to  Western  airstrikes,  notably  by 
mingling  with  the  Libyan  population  thus 
rendering  airstrikes  morally  untenable  and 
tactically  limited.  Without  a  change  in  the 
international coalition’s strategy, civil war could 
plague  Libya  for  years.  Surely  not  much  an 
improvement  from  autocratic  oppression  for 
most Libyans. 
 
The  fate  of  Libya  –  and  its  people  –  will b e  
decided  by  the  power  of  the  gun.  Yet,  as 
important as the outcome of this conflict will 
be, there was perhaps more to learn from the 
diplomatic  hubbub  surrounding  this  conflict 
than  there  is  from  the  deafening  sound  of 
gunshots  and  explosions.  The  vote  on 
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Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) was more than a vote on the Libyan 
crisis. It was a telltale of the new global order 
in the making.  
 
Why  was  the  US  so  soft-spoken  on  Libya? 
Why  did  the  BRIC  countries  (Brazil,  Russia, 
India, China) abstain in the UNSC? What does 
this  tell  us  about  the  state  of  international 
relations?  And  what  are  the  implications  for 
the  EU?  Such  are  the  questions  that  this 
Security Policy Brief tackles.  
 
Understanding the BRIC Abstention 
UNSC  Resolution  1973  authorising  “all 
necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians 
from  Muammar  Gaddafi  was  voted  by  ten 
members  while  five  members  decided  to 
abstain:  Brazil,  China,  Germany,  India  and 
Russia, that is to say the BRIC countries plus 
Germany.  This  largely  unexpected  vote 
triggered  many  reactions  and  debates  across 
the  world.  A  better  understanding  of  the 
reasons behind some key national positions is 
therefore necessary. 
 
Overall, three factors had a significant impact 
on  BRIC  decision-making.  First,  at  the 
personal level (which is often underestimated 
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in international relations), no BRIC leader was 
ever particularly comfortable with the person of 
Gaddafi.  Second,  at  the  national  level,  the 
defection of the Libyan ambassador to the UN 
calling overtly for sanctions against the Gaddafi 
regime was a strong signal to UNSC members, 
offering  local  legitimacy  to  the  resolution. 
Third, at the regional level, the support of the 
Arab  League  for  a  no-fly-zone  offered  a  key 
regional guarantee to UNSC members. In this 
context,  the  resolution  appeared  more 
acceptable to countries traditionally opposed to 
intervention.  
 
Breaking down the UNSC vote, the abstention 
of  China  and  Russia  should  be  differentiated 
from  the  abstention  of  Brazil,  Germany  and 
India. As permanent members of the UNSC, 
they could indeed have used their veto power 
to oppose the resolution but instead chose to 
abstain. They did not hesitate to use their veto 
power in the past, notably on Zimbabwe and 
Myanmar, to oppose intervention, or the threat 
of  the  veto  to  water  down  resolutions,  thus 
sometimes forcing the West to bypass the UN, 
like in Kosovo. This abstention can therefore 
be  seen  as  a  constructive  vote  –  an  implicit 
green light. Beijing and Moscow permitted the 
intervention,  while  protecting  their  necessary 
liberty  to  criticize  the  resolution  and,  more 
broadly,  “Western  interventionism”  (Russian 
Prime  Minister  Vladimir  Putin  called  it  a 
“crusade”,  a  term  Medvedev  deemed 
inappropriate).  
 
It is true that the two countries do not have 
vital interests in Libya, at best minor economic 
interests. Nonetheless, this vote could signal a 
shift in Chinese diplomacy as there is simply no 
precedent  of  China  supporting  Western 
intervention  based  on  purely  humanitarian 
concerns or on the “responsibility to protect”. 
One reading of the Chinese vote could be that 
due  to  the  globalisation  of  China’s  interests, 
Beijing is now bound to act more responsibly 
in the international system, particularly in such 
cases where its vital interests are not at stake. 
Yet another reading of the vote suggests that 
China might have welcomed another conflict 
that  could  possibly  engulf  Western  powers 
while Beijing could continue focussing on its 
own  economic  emergence  and  on  strategic 
interests of its own. Both readings are in fact 
not  incompatible.  It  should  be  emphasised 
nonetheless  that  China  did  not  encourage  a 
Western  intervention;  it  probably  even f e a r s  
the  long-term  implications  of  a  stronger 
(militarised)  view  on  the  “responsibility  to 
protect”  and  “regime  change”  by W e s t e r n  
decision-makers,  as  illustrated  by  China’s 
recent call to halt airstrikes.  
 
For  Russia,  traditionally  opposed  to  the 
concept of “responsibility to protect”, the vote 
on Libya was also a rather unusual position. In 
the  absence  of  vital  interests  in  Libya,  one 
reading of the Russian position suggests that 
Moscow  might  have  considered  that  its 
strategic partnership with France was at stake 
and  that  the  preservation  of  this  partnership 
was  more  important  than  its  concerns  about 
the  “responsibility  to  protect”  and  “regime 
change”, perhaps facilitated by good contacts 
between Russian president Dimitri Medvedev 
and  French  president  Nicolas  Sarkozy.  The 
economic  benefits  from  spiking  prices  of 
natural resources following the sanctions and 
the intervention in Libya were surely seen as a 
positive  collateral  effect  of  the  resolution 
against  Gaddafi.  Another  reading,  similar  to 
China,  suggests  that  Moscow  might  have 
welcomed one more opportunity to engulf the 
West in another protracted conflict. 
 
Brazil, Germany and India could not veto the 
resolution. Nevertheless, as the three countries 
are  candidates  for  a  permanent  seat  on  the 
UNSC, they surely did not take their decision 
lightly as short-term negative consequences for 
their candidacy were to be expected. It is likely   3 
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that  (some  of)  the  reasons  behind  their 
abstention  were  similar  to  those  behind  the 
Chinese and Russian abstention: an absence of 
vital interest and a tradition of caution vis-à-vis 
intervention and the “responsibility to protect”, 
although  recognizing  that  Libya  might  be  an 
exception, not least due to local and regional 
support for intervention. 
 
The case of Germany is undoubtedly the most 
puzzling one from a European point of view, 
for  it  created  a  divided  European  front  on  a 
resolution  that  had  after  all  been  put  on  the 
table by two other European members of the 
UNSC. This German dissension was even more 
puzzling – for Europeans as well as for external 
observers – because Libya is in Europe’s own 
backyard, where stability and prosperity should 
be seen as matters of vital interest. There can 
only be speculations on the German vote, but 
one  explanation  could  be  a  sort  of  neo-
Thatcherism,  as  Germans  “want  their  money 
back”  and  appear  reluctant  to  spend  their 
Euros  on  another  dubious  military  adventure 
(particularly  one  led  by  the  French  and  the 
British together), but perhaps also reluctant to 
see  other  countries  spend  their  Euros  on 
external  intervention  in  times  of  economic 
austerity.  This  could  explain  why  Germany 
opposed the intervention militarily (by refusing 
to contribute to the intervention) and politically 
(by  refusing  to  support  the  resolution). 
Furthermore,  there  were  obviously  important 
electoral considerations, in light of Germany’s 
shift  of  position  after  the  latest  elections  to 
support  the  deployment  of  a  CSDP 
humanitarian  operation,  even  proposing a  
German contribution.  
 
Finally, the support of some UNSC members 
for the resolution can be equally surprising as 
the abstention of others. This was particularly 
the case of South Africa and the other African 
members of the UNSC who decided to support 
the resolution in spite of the adoption 
days before of a conflicting plan of the 
African Union (AU) to settle the crisis 
peacefully and diplomatically – the AU 
has  in  fact  been  largely  marginalised 
since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis.  The 
African  countries  were  most  likely 
under heavy international pressure, for 
their vote could tilt the balance in the 
Security Council and, at the same time, it was 
seen  as  a  decisive  African  support  to  the 
coalition.  
 
It  should  be  pointed  out  that  South  Africa 
voted  against  the  African  Union,  but  also 
against the BRIC (of which it is now a member 
in the new grouping BRICS, since December 
2010).  This  confirms  that  there  was  no 
coordinated  position  among  the  BRICS. 
Although  the  BRIC(S)  countries  share  some 
similar  concerns  over  (the  intervention  in) 
Libya, their vote was rather the accidental result 
of  different  reasoning  than  of  a  coordinated 
voting strategy. 
 
A Post-American World 
The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent 
the new international order that is taking shape. 
This international order in the making is less 
dominated by Washington as it becomes more 
multipolar, and it is less predictable as emerging 
powers  grasp  new  strategic  opportunities  to 
push  forward  their  influence  and  ultimately 
their interests. 
 
First  characteristic  of  the  new  international 
“The  case  of  Germany  is 
undoubtedly  the  most  puzzling 
one  from  a  European  point  of 
view”   4 
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order:  it  seems  less  and  less  American  as 
illustrated  by  the  relatively  discrete  profile 
adopted  by  Washington  on  the  whole  Libyan 
crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. Part of 
the  explanation  for  this  discrete  profile  lies  in 
the  personality  of  Barack  Obama  who  has 
developed  a  much  more  cautious  approach  to 
international  problems  in  comparison  with  his 
predecessor, particularly in the Arab world. As 
the 2012 presidential election is nearing, Obama 
seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular 
war. Another important explanatory factor is the 
American  reluctance  to  commit  to  another 
potential  long  war,  after  the  disastrous 
experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both 
conflicts which were supposed to end quickly, 
like Libya.  
 
Yet,  there  is  inevitably  a  third  explanation  for 
America’s  discrete  profile  on  Libya:  the  US  is 
slowly  losing  its  uncontested  hegemony  in 
international  security,  notably  due  to  the  so-
called multipolarization of the international order. 
This looks very much like the “post-American 
world” described by Fareed Zakaria. The US is 
now  less  interventionist  by  choice  and  by 
necessity  –  in  this  new  international  order, 
Washington must choose carefully its priorities 
in  terms  of  foreign  policy  for  it  is  simply  no 
longer  able  to  be  present  simultaneously  on 
every front, let alone to lead. The soft-spoken 
American  posture  is  a  clear  political  choice 
related  to  domestic  pressures  but  it  is  also  a 
matter of necessity, as the phantoms of military 
and  economic  overstretch  are  present  in  all 
minds. 
The  Libyan  crisis  was  a  first  illustration  of 
what happens when the US takes a backseat. 
Europe  and  the  emerging  powers  are  just 
discovering what this “post-American world” 
means in practice. This is a world of strategic 
opportunities where established and emerging 
powers  can  increasingly  pursue  their  own 
agenda, independently from the US. The era of 
“you  are  with  us  or  against  us”  is  inevitably 
over. For now, Europe is in the driving seat 
and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intra-
European divisions, America still feels pretty 
safe. But from Brasilia to Beijing, world leaders 
are contemplating this new American posture 
with interest. Could they be next in the driving 
seat?  
 
Second  characteristic:  the  emerging 
global  order  is  probably  more 
fragmented  than  during  the  previous 
bipolar  era.  Emerging  powers  have 
become  sufficiently  assertive  to 
confront  the  West  on  some  issues 
(sometimes individually, sometimes as 
a bloc), but remain prudent enough to 
avoid  endangering  their  rise  by 
investing  too  much  in  revisionist  postures. 
This  fragmentation  makes  international 
cooperation  to  solve  global  challenges  more 
difficult.  On  the  other  hand,  the  world  is 
increasingly  interdependent  and 
interconnected  as  largely  illustrated  by  the 
recent  economic  crisis.  Global 
interdependence  per  se  is  not  new,  but 
according  to  some  scholars  today’s 
interdependence  is  creating  favourable 
conditions  for  international  cooperation,  for 
there is simply no alternative to address some 
of the most pressing global challenges. Thus, 
at the moment, the tension between factors of 
fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) 
and  cohesion  maintains  the  international 
system in flux and makes it less predictable. 
 
“The  vote  on  Libya  reflects  to  a 
certain  extent  the  new 
international  order  that  is  taking 
shape”   5 
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The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal 
with Russia and China constructively abstaining 
rather than using their veto power. Whether this 
constructive posture will develop as the rule or 
will remain an exception remains to be seen. As 
emerging powers continue to build their global 
footprint  and  to  develop  global  interests,  they 
are  more  likely  to  develop  a  sophisticated 
foreign policy. Yet the direction of such foreign 
policy remains unclear. 
 
Lessons for the EU 
London and Paris were right to make the case 
for an intervention in Libya in the first place, 
strategically,  morally  and  legally.  A  more 
assertive policy in Europe’s neighbourhood was 
long overdue, although a long-term strategy for 
the region, beyond the current operations, is still 
awaited.  Libya  has  proved  nonetheless t h a t  
European  Member  States  alone  (in  this  case, 
France  and  the  UK,  followed  by  a  few  other 
European  countries,  including  Belgium)  are 
unable to sustain the responsibility and the costs 
of  a  full-fledged  air-sea-and-ground  operation. 
In  other  words,  without  the  US, 
Europe  still  seems  unable  to  impose 
order in its own backyard. The lesson 
should be that it is only when acting 
together  –  at  the  EU  level  –  that  all 
conditions  for  a  sustainable 
intervention  can  be  fulfilled,  i.e. 
legitimacy,  capabilities  and  cost-
sharing.  
 
Libya is no country for old powers. If Europe 
wants to weigh in the post-American world, it 
needs to come together as a new power: the EU. 
Of course, if the EU wants to become a global 
power, it first needs to assert itself as a power in 
its  own  region.  This  implies  a  vision,  political 
will, and money. 
 
The world beyond Libya is vast, however. While 
a stable neighbourhood is in the EU’s interest, 
Brussels should not forget its true long-term 
objective, which is to secure its power status 
on the global stage. To do so, the EU needs to 
develop  a  grand  strategy  that  clearly  states  the 
interests  it  seeks  to  pursue  and  how  to 
prioritise  them,  as  well  as  sub-strategies  for 
relevant  regions  of  interest,  including  the 
Mediterranean  region,  and  vis-à-vis  key  third 
players, notably the BRICS. 
 
The  case  of  Libya  clearly  demonstrates h o w  
detrimental the lack of grand strategy can be to 
the  EU  as  an  intervention  in  Libya  was 
considered  of  vital  importance  by  some 
Member  States  yet  not  so  much  by  others. 
Article  34  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  reads: 
“Member  States  which  are  members  of  the 
Security Council will, in the execution of their 
functions,  defend  the  positions  and  the 
interests of the Union”. But in the absence of 
grand strategy, it is simply left to the Member 
States to decide on an ad hoc basis what the 
EU’s interests are, resulting in uncertainty and 
confusion for Europe and its partners. 
 
There is little that the EU can hope to achieve 
alone, without the support of other established 
and  emerging  powers.  The  UNSC  resolution 
on Libya was a foretaste of the post-American 
world. In order to pursue its interests and to 
cope with global challenges, the EU needs to 
develop  effective  sub-strategies  vis-à-vis 
established  and  emerging  powers.  In  theory, 
the EU already has ten strategic partnerships 
with key third countries (Brazil, Canada, China, 
“While a stable neighbourhood is 
in  the  EU’s  interest,  Brussels 
should  not  forget  its  true  long-
term objective: to secure its power 
status on the global stage”   6   
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India,  Japan,  Mexico,  South  Africa,  South 
Korea,  Russia  and  the  US) b u t  t h e s e  
partnerships  have  lacked  implementation. 
President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy  initiated  a  rethink  of  these  strategic 
partnerships in 2010, but concrete measures are 
still expected. 
 
The  Libyan  crisis  showed  once  again  that 
Europe  cannot  just  rely  on  the  US.  The  EU 
needs  to  become  an  autonomous  power, 
pursuing its own grand strategy. Of course, the 
EU cannot solve all international challenges on 
its own, and as it emerges as a global power, it 
will  need  reliable  allies  and  true  strategic 
partners. In the Libyan case, emerging powers 
were  ready  to  assume  a  constructive  role  in 
international  security.  As  it  is  unclear  yet 
whether such constructive behaviour will be the 
rule or the exception, the EU needs to develop 
true  strategic  partnerships  to  encourage  such 
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behaviour in the future. Together, the EU and 
its strategic partners can establish a safer and 
more prosperous world order. 
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